The False Pretenses Statute In Nebraska by Blessing, Alfred W.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 33 | Issue 3 Article 14
1954
The False Pretenses Statute In Nebraska
Alfred W. Blessing
University of Nebraska College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation




Nebraska, however, "... a promissory representation as to some future
action to be taken by the person making the roepresentation where
made with the present intent that such future action would not be
performed or carried out... ." is a false pretense within the statute.1
Nebraska's first statute2 covering false pretenses was enacted dur-
ing the time Nebraska was an organized territory and was patterned
after the English statute3 covering larceny by false pretenses. When
the Nebraska state government was organized it adopted a statute4
which was substantively identical to the territorial law and couched
in practically the same language. In 1904, the Nebraska Supreme
Court ruled5 that false promises were not within the definition of the
phrase "false pretenses" as it was used in the act. Although in so hold-
ing the court followed the great weight of authority, only a single
landmark case 6 and two contemporary texts7 were cited in the opinion.
From time to time amendments further defined "property" and provid-
ed more protection for creditors, but the interpretation of false pre-
tenses, in keeping with the orthodox pattern, remained the same. In
1947, an amendment s was enacted which expressly included false
promises and made them actionable. The legislative history 9 indicates
that this amendment was introduced because of Hameyer v. State,0
which arose in Seward County, home of the bill's sponsor.
The evidence in this case showed that Hameyer appeared at the
home of Woebbecke and stated that if Woebbecke would pay him
$1,600 he would procure an oil and gas lease which Woebbecke could
sell for $32,000. Woebbecke readily agreed to this and paid the money.
Some thirty days later Hameyer returned and, upon the representa-
tion that the deal was progressing nicely but some more cash was
needed, he received another $1,000. In thirty days Hameyer again
visited Woebbecke and this time he produced a fake oil lease; Woeb-
becke paid him $2,800 as requested. Hameyer returned a fourth time
and obtained $1,200 after stating that the man who was willing to
'Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1207 (Reissue 1948).
' Neb. Terr. Rev. Stat., Crim. Code. § 157 (1866).
'30 Geo. 2, c. 24 (1757).
'4 Neb. Gen. Stat. c. 58, § 125 (1873).
'Cook v. State, 71 Neb. 243, 98 N.W. 810 (1904).
"Dillingham v. State, 5 Ohio St. 280 (1855).
"McClain, Criminal Law § 668 (1897); Maxwell, Criminal Procedure § 129
(1896).8 Neb. Laws c. 99, p. 282 (1947).
'Statement by Judiciary Committee on L. B. 242 (60th Sess. 1947): "This
bill provides for broadening the definition of the offense of obtaining money
or property under false pretenses by permitting it to cover a promissory
representation to do something in the future when it is made with the pre-
sent intent that the future act will not be performed. It is designed to
strengthen the law to prosecute swindlers."
'o 148 Neb. 798, 29 N.W2d 458 (1947).
NOTES
pay the $32,000 was waiting in Lincoln. An action was brought against
Hameyer alleging -four counts of obtaining money by false pretenses.
The lower court dismissed the first two counts on the ground that the
representations were merely promissory; the last two counts brought
a conviction. The case went to the Nebraska Supreme Court on appeal
and about six months after the legislature had passed the amendment
as an emergency measure the opinion was handed down. In essense,
the court stated that prior to the amendment the statute covered only
misrepresentations of existing facts, however the false statements by
Hameyer were interpreted as existing facts, i.e., Hameyer represented
a present ability to procure a lease. Thus after the final disposition of
the case Hameyer could have been prosecuted on any of the four
counts. It is possible, however, that the court was influenced by the
legislative amendment. It is interesting to note that no authority for
this particular interpretation is cited and it appears for the first and
only time in any Nebraska opinion.
A brief survey of other false pretenses statutes" proves interesting
in conjunction with the study of the Nebraska statute. Although the
overwhelming majority of states do not denominate obtaining prop-
erty by false promises a criminal act, there are a few which do. The
first time that false promises were made actionable as criminal fraud
was under the federal mail fraud statute.12 This was effected initially
by judicial interpretation, 13 and later by legislative amendment.14 At
the time that the Nebraska legislature amended its statute, only Louisi-
ana3 had a statutory provision which expressly included false prom-
ises. However, Rhode Island, 6 California 7 and Massachusetts' s have
brought false promises within the purview of their criminal codes
through judicial interpretation upon the theory that the "state of mind"
of an individual is an existing fact. Thus, a promise to perform some
act in the future with no present intent to perform it, is regarded as a
" For a detailed and well-documented treatment of this field of law, see
Pearce, Theft by False Promises, 101 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 967 (1953).
.2 17 Stat. 283, 323 (1872).
" Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306 (1896).
14 62 Stat. 763 (1948); 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Supp. 1952).
"I La. Code Crim. Law and Proc. art. 740-60 (1943) (The comments which
follow this article at p. 513 serve to clarify its meaning. "Whenever the situa-
tion is such that the transaction between the parties could be avoided because
of fraud the defrauder is guilty of theft .... it is intended to produce identity
of meaning between civil and criminal fraud. .. ") Civil fraud of course
includes false promises; see Restatement, Torts §§ 525, 530 (1938); Prosser,
Torts 705 (1941).
" State v. McMahon, 49 R.I. 107, 140 Atl. 359 (1928).
17 Jeople v. Jones, 36 Cal.2d 373, 224 P.2d 353 (1950); People v. Ames, 61
Cal. App. 522, 143 P.2d 92 (1943).
"s Commonwealth v. Green, 326 Mass. 344, 94 N.E.2d 260 (1950); Common-
wealth v. Morrison, 252 Mass. 116, 147 N.E. 588 (1925).
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misrepresentation of an existing fact. In 1943, Ohio initially"9 passed
a statute2 0 referring expressly to false pretenses and in 1949 the Ohio
Supreme Court included false promises,21 citing the judicial construc-
tion of the federal mail fraud statute.22 In 1952, the legislature of New
Jersey passed a statute23 which expressly includes false promises. How-
ever, legislative history seems to indicate that the lawmakers were
merely combining two sections of their prior criminal code24 and
did not intend that there should be a substantive change in the law.
There are cogent policy reasons which support Nebraska's statute.
First, the distinction between misrepresentations of fact and promises
is, by its very nature, a difficult one. Many statements fall into that
twilight zone between fact and opinion or promise; it is exceedingly
difficult to determine whether or not an individual is violating the
law. Second, if misrepresentations of fact are punishable while false
promises are not, a premium is placed upon form and the importance
of substance is minimized. This is anomalous in that the antisocial
nature of the act remains regardless of the form used to convey a false
impression. Third, as a matter of ethics the use of false promises
should be discouraged; certainly the granting of a sanction in the law
is a logical manifestation of society's attitude toward such conduct.
The old notion that you trust a man at your peril has become the
exception rather than the rule. One of the essential tenets of modern
civilization is that man is basically honest. Finally, since business in
the modern world requires many credit transactions, it becomes im-
portant that fraud in all forms be discouraged because of its adverse
effect upon credit.
There are two policy reasons which have frequently been used
by the courts and text writers as a rationale for the orthodox strict
interpretation of false pretenses. First, it is urged that if prosecution
for false promises were authorized, defaulting debtors would be sub-
ject to abusive prosecutions designed to force them to pay. Theoretical-
ly, at least, these prosecutions could be brought whenever a debtor
promised to pay at some future time and then later defaulted. One
of the best ways to evaluate such an argument is to determine whether
" Previously there had been a statute dealing with the crime of theft in
general terms; Ohio Gen. Code Ann. § 12447-1 (Supp. 1938).
" Ohio Code Ann. § 12447-1 (Supp. 1952).
1 State v. Singleton, 85 Ohio App. 245, 87 N.E.2d 358 (1949). The court fol-
lowed their previous holding in a more recent case, State v. Healy, 156 Ohio
229, 102 N.E.2d 233 (1951). Effective in 1953, still another statute has been
adopted by the Ohio Legislature; Ohio Rev. Code § 2907.01 (1953). However, the
wording of this latest revision is substantively the same as the 1943 statute
and thus it is likely that the court's definition of false pretense will apply to
the revision so that there is actually no change in the law.
22 Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306 (1896).
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:111-1 (1952).
-'N.J. Rev. Stat. §§ 2:134-1, 2:134-2 (1939).

